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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920732-CA
Priority No. 2

TODD ALLEN PARKER,
Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Relevant statutes, rules and constitutional provisions are
set forth in Addendum A.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue;

Did the trial judge commit reversible error in

refusing to order the return of fees paid by Defendant to a state run
treatment facility after Defendant's conviction was reversed on
appeal and the case against him was dismissed in the trial court?
Standard of Review;

This issue involves a question of law

which this Court reviews for correctness.

See generally State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3, 782 (Utah 1991); Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information dated September 10, 1990, the State
charged Defendant/Appellant Todd Allen Parker with three counts of
Burglary, a second degree felony.

R. 6-7.

The trial court denied Appellant's motions to suppress and
convicted Appellant as charged on all three counts following a bench
trial held on March 7, 1991. R. 25.
On April 5, 1991, the trial judge sentenced Appellant on
each of the three counts.

R. 26-9. Thereafter, Appellant appealed

his convictions to this Court.
In an Opinion dated June 12, 1992, this Court reversed all
three of Appellant's convictions and remanded his case to the trial
court.

A copy of the Opinion in State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah

App. 1992), is contained in Addendum B.
On July 31, 1992, after the case was remanded to the trial
court, the State moved to dismiss the charges against Appellant.
R. 51. The trial court granted that motion.

R. 51, 52.

Thereafter, Appellant filed a "Motion for Return of Fine, Costs and
Fees."

R. 53. A copy of Appellant's "Motion for Return" is

contained in Addendum C.
The trial judge held hearings on August 28, 1992 and
September 15, 1992 on Appellant's motion.

R. 71-78.

At each

hearing, the trial judge continued the matter and ordered the State
to make a decision as to the position it was taking on Appellant's
motion.

R. 73, 76.

Thereafter, on September 15, 1992, the trial

judge entered a minute entry which indicates that the State "will
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stipulate to return the fines, but object to any monies returned for
rehabilitation.

The court so orders." R. 56. On October 16, 1992,

the court entered its written order denying the return of the fees
paid to Fremont Center.

R. 59. A copy of that order is contained

in Addendum D.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 5, 1991, the trial judge sentenced Appellant to
concurrently serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison on
each of the counts and to pay a fine of $10,000 on each count.
R. 26-9. The judge stayed the prison sentence and fine and placed
Appellant on eighteen months probation under the supervision of the
Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole.

R. 26-9.

The conditions of probation were that Appellant pay a fine
of $800 and a 25 percent surcharge, make full restitution, obtain
his G.E.D. degree, and enter and complete a psychological program at
Salt Lake County Mental Health.

R. 29.

In addition, the judge

ruled that if the probation department determined it was
appropriate, Appellant was to attend and complete the live-in
program at the state run Fremont Center.

R. 29; T. April 5, 1991 at

7-8.1

1. Fremont Center is a state funded program which is run by the
Department of Corrections. During sentencing, defense counsel took
issue with the recommendation in the presentence report that
Appellant go to the year or longer residential treatment program at
the Fremont Center. T. April 5, 1991 at 3-4. Nevertheless, the
trial judge indicated that Appellant was to go to that residential
program as a term of probation if the probation department thought
the program appropriate.

- 3 -

Appellant paid the required fine and attended the Fremont
program.

R. 73. While attending that program, Appellant paid $180

per month for nine months to that program.

R. 73.

The State stipulated to the return of the fines paid by
Appellant but apparently refused to stipulate to the return of the
R. 56. 2

money paid for the treatment program.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to
return fees paid by Appellant to a state run treatment facility as a
condition of probation.

After this Court reversed Appellant's

convictions and the trial court dismissed the charges, the
previously ordered sentence was no longer legal, and the trial court
was required to order the return of any fees or fines paid by
Appellant as a condition of probation, to the State.

2. The basis for the State's position in the trial court is not
clear from the record. Although the trial judge put the matter over
until the afternoon of September 15, 1992, no hearing occurred that
afternoon and defense counsel was not informed of and did not
participate in any further proceedings on this issue. Nevertheless,
the trial judge issued a minute entry on September 15, 1992,
indicating that the State stipulated to the return of the fines but
objected to returning fees paid to Fremont. R. 56.

- 4
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ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO RETURN
FEES PAID BY APPELLANT AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION
TO A STATE RUN TREATMENT PROGRAM.
Although no Utah rule, statute or constitutional provision
explicitly controls the issue raised in this case, a number of
provisions provide guidance in assessing whether fees paid by
Appellant to the state run Fremont program as a condition of
probation should be returned when the conviction and sentence were
vacated.3

3. Although neither the parties nor trial judge stated that Fremont
Center is a state run program, such information is common knowledge
to trial judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers who often deal with
persons who are sentenced to Fremont Center as a condition of
probation. Indeed, the phone number for the Fremont Community
Center is listed in the Utah State Government section of the
telephone book under the heading "Corrections Department." See
Addendum E.
Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
A judge can take judicial notice without being requested by either
party to do so. Utah R. Evid. 201(c) (1993). Judicial notice is
mandatory "if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information." Utah R. Evid. 201(d) (1993). For a judge to take
judicial notice, the matter must be (1) information of common or
general knowledge; (b) well settled and "not doubtful or uncertain";
(c) "known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court." DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 613 P.2d 1120,
1124 (Utah 1980). In sentencing a person to Fremont Center, the
trial judge most certainly was aware of this common and certain
knowledge that Fremont Center is run by the Department of
Corrections.
(continued)
- 5 -

A. UTAH RULES AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE
THE RETURN OF THE FEES,
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993)
provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time,"

Because

Appellant's conviction has been overturned and the charges
dismissed, the sentence is illegal and must be corrected.

See

generally United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1973);
("Since the district court was empowered to set aside the
conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the
conviction and require the repayment of money collected as fines.");
State v. Danielson, 809 P.2d 937 (Alaska App. 1991); People v.
Reqqel, 28 P. 955 (Utah 1892).
Rule 28, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993) discusses
"Disposition after appeal."

It states:

Rule 28. Disposition after appeal.
(a) If a judgment of conviction is
reversed, a new trial shall be held unless
otherwise specified by the appellate court.
Pending a new trial or other proceeding, the

(footnote 3 continued)
Furthermore, this Court has discretion to take judicial
notice on appeal. Utah R. Evid. 201(c) (1993); Mel Trimble Real
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988).
Because the proceedings below implicitly establish that the trial
judge and parties were aware that Fremont Center is part of the
Department of Corrections, judicial notice of that fact does not
present a situation where the concept of judicial notice is used to
circumvent the requirement that issues not be raised for the first
time on appeal. See Id. at 455-6.
Because the fact that Fremont Center is a state run program
within the Department of Corrections is a matter of common knowledge
to trial judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers, is not doubtful
and is within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court, judicial
notice of that fact is appropriate.
- 6 -

defendant shall be detained, or released upon
bail, or otherwise restricted as the trial court
on remand determines proper. If no further trial
or proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody
shall be discharged, and a defendant restricted by
bail or otherwise shall be released from
restriction and bail exonerated and any deposit of
funds or property refunded to the proper person.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States constitution
provides that no person shall be "deprived of . . . property without
due process of law."

In United States v. Lewis, 342 F.Supp. 833,

836 (E.D. La. 1972), affirmed 478 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1973), the
Court held that the Fifth Amendment required the restitution of
fines paid by a defendant where the defendant's conviction was
subsequently vacated.
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking
of one's property without due process of law
demands no less than the full restitution of a
fine that was levied pursuant to a conviction
based on an unconstitutional law. Fairness and
equity compel this result, and a citizen has the
right to expect as much from his government,
notwithstanding the fact that the government and
the court were proceeding in good faith at the
time of the prosecution.
Lewis, 342 F.Supp. at 836; see also State v. Stein, 806 P.2d 346,
347 (Alaska App. 1991), quoting United States v. Lewis, 342 F.Supp.
at 836 (principles of equity and the Fifth Amendment require the
return of fines paid by the defendant in excess of the amount
allowed by law); accord State v. Danielson, 809 P.2d 937; Ex parte
McCurley, 412 So.2d 1236, 1237-8 (Ala. 1982).
Various other courts have held that fines and fees paid to
the state as a condition of probation must be returned to the
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defendant when a conviction is subsequently vacated.4

In State v.

Sup. Ct.y 410 P.2d 502, 503-4 (Ariz. 1966), the court held a fine
paid by a defendant in lieu of bond must be returned when the
conviction is overturned on appeal.
On a successful appeal the person charged is
entitled to all the benefits of his success.
. . .

The fine paid in lieu of bond and possibly in lieu
of confinement until he could post bond and until
the appeal could be perfected, is to be restored
to him.
Id.
In People v. Meyerowitz, 335 N.E.2d 1, 7 (111. 1975), the
court held that the defendants were "entitled to a refund of the
fines and costs they [] paid as a result of their void
convictions."

In reaching its decision, the court determined that

the payment of a fine as a condition of probation is not voluntary
since "willful refusal to pay the fine could have resulted in
revocation of the probation and the incarceration of the
defendant."

Jd.

The court stated:

We are of the opinion that the money, having been
received in payment of fines imposed as an
incident to judgments of conviction, should be
ordered refunded as an incident to the vacation of
the judgments under which it was ordered.

4. Appellant has been unable to find much case law directly
discussing the return of fines or fees after a reversal on appeal.
Instead, much of the case law arises in the context where a
defendant has entered a guilty plea pursuant to a statute which is
later found unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v. Meyerowitz, 335
N.E.2d 1 (111. 1975); Ex parte McCurley, 412 So.2d 1236. The issue
in such cases focuses on whether the defendant has a right to the
return of fines or fees where he voluntarily pled guilty. Perhaps
because of the obvious requirement that fines and fees must be
returned where a conviction is reversed on appeal and the case
dismissed on remand, little case law exists in that area.
- 8
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335 N.E.2d at 8.
In United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d at 836, the court stated:
Just as the imposition of a fine is an incident of
a criminal conviction, so is the direction for
repayment an incident to the vacating and setting
aside of the conviction.
Accord State v. Piekkola, 241 N.W.2d 563, 564 (S.C. 1976), reversed
on other grounds, In re Estate of Erdmann, 447 N.W.2d 356, 359 (S.C.
1989) ; see also Mossew v. United States, 266 F. 18 (2d Cir. 1920).
The court's ability to correct an illegal sentence coupled
with the Fifth Amendment protection require that fees paid to the
state by a defendant in order to fulfill a condition of probation
that the defendant attend a state run treatment program be refunded
where the conviction is subsequently vacated.

In the present case,

where Appellant attended the state run Fremont program as a
condition of probation, the trial court committed reversible error
in refusing to refund the fees paid by Appellant to the State.

B. ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
REQUIRES THE RETURN OF THE FEES.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law."

That provision was adopted as part of the

original Utah constitution in 1897 and has remained in effect
throughout Utah's statehood.
Although the language of Article I, Section 7 is identical
to that of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States constitution, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized
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that Article I, Section 7 provides greater due process protection in
some contexts than does its federal counterpart.

See State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (greater scrutiny given to eyewitness
identification testimony under state due process than under federal
due process); Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991)
(inmate has right to state due process at Board of Pardons hearing
even though no federal due process right exists at such hearings).
In the present case, although Appellant did not articulate a
distinct legal analysis under the Utah constitution, he did
articulate his claim that retention of fees paid by him as a
condition of probation to a state run residential program violated
his right to due process under the state constitution.

Although

none of the cases relied upon in the previous section explicitly
discuss a state constitutional analysis, they nevertheless support
Appellant's state constitutional claim.

See, e.g., United States v.

Lewis, 478 F.2d 835; United States v. Lewis, 342 F.Supp. 833, 835;
State v. Sup. Ct., 410 P.2d at 503-4; People v. Meyerowitz, 335
N.E.2d at 7.
The decisions to return fines and costs rely on fairness,
equity and/or the constitutional proscription against deprivation of
property without due process.

The rationale for such decisions is

equally applicable to a determination as to whether a procedure
complies with state due process.

Retention of the fees paid by

Mr. Parker to a state run treatment program as a condition of

- 10 -

probation violates state due process under these circumstances where
the conviction has been vacated.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's order denying the return of fees paid to a state run
treatment program as a condition of probation.

SUBMITTED this cffi" day of June, 1993.

<^^Ud£6/
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J./REMAL

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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DELIVERED this
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ADDENDUM A

78-2a-& Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) Th^ Canrt of App^gJg hag gpp^jfyc^ jr^py ?r<'f^nw ^^^^fr7gjTTTfyiictirrn of
i ii CifT'li KXLLm y appeals, over?
CO appeals fenn a court of record in ^wminai rnnm, except those involving a conviction o£ a first degree or ^[y^H felony?

ARTICLE IL
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial nonce of adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been tnk**,
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court «han set
a tune forfrwpnrnigsentence which shall be not less than two
nor more ^ a f f 30 days after the verdict or plea, rmifrss the court, with the:
ooncnrrence of the ^Vfrwdawg, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the A*tmAmT. or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before 'n?*?**""? sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to T7«^*» a statement ux his own behalf and to present any informanon in
mitigation of mizushznent, or to show any legal cause wny sentence should nor
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
prgMn* any informanon m****™! to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds ***«* a ^Vf**"* may be tried in his absence, he
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a rlefrnfiaTit tails to appear fixe
sentence, a warrant tor his arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall'
jiHTw* sentence ar>r* «h«n enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence, Following imposition of
j^ynwir* the court «h«n advise the ^ ^ " ^ of his right to appeal and the
frmm within which any anpeal shall be died.
(d) When a jail or onson sentence is imposed, tie court shall issue its
commitment setting tbrth the sentence. The officer deiivermg the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true cony of the commitment to the jail or
pnson and snail make tus return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e> The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any ame.

CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Const. Amend V reads:
Ho person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, ?hen
in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be cr^ice puc in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without, just
compensation.

A M E N D M E N T XIV

Section 1* [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Rule 28. Disposition on appeaL
(a) If a judgment of conviction is reversed* a new trial shall be held unless
otherwise specified by the appellate court. Pending a new trial or other proceeding, the defendant shall be detained, or released upon bail, or otherwise
restricted as the trial court on remand determines proper. If no further trial or
proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody shall be discharged, and a
defendant restricted by bail or otherwise shall be releasedfiromrestriction
and bail exonerated and any deposit of funds or properly refunded to the
proper person*
(b) Upon affirmance by the appellate court, the judgment or order affirmed
or modified shall be executed,
(c) A party may, within 20 days, petition the appellate court for a rehearing; During this 20-day period or iwmding disposition of a petition fig rehear*
ing; and upon application of a party, the trial court may enter such orders as
are necessary to insure the defendant's presence to comply with the judgment
or make such other orders as are appropriate in the case. Uponfinalcompletion of an appeal, the entire record on appeal shall be remitted to the clerk of
the lower court.
(d) In proper cases, upon motion of any party, the remittitur may be stayed
pending proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States or another
court. In such case, the appellate court or the trial court may make such
orders in the case pending further proceedings as are necessary or appropriate.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ABTICLE I

S e c 7. [Due process of law.]
%

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without dzxe process
of law.

ADDENDUM B
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reverse and remand for reinstatement of
the jury verdict and sentencing.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Todd Allen PARKER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 910265-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 12, 1992.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F.
Wilkinson, J., of burglary of a dwelling,
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Russon, J., held that police lacked required
probable cause to arrest him so that his
subsequent statements had to be suppressed.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Automobiles <s»349(2)
Reasonableness of traffic stop, which
is limited seizure and more like investigative detention than custodial arrest, is assessed under principles governing investigative detentions based on whether officer's action was justified in it inception and
whether action was reasonably related m
scope to circumstances which justified initial interference. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends.
4, 5.
2. Automobiles e=>349(2)
Officer had justification for initial stop
of defendant where defendant was driving
45 miles per hour in 25-mile per hour zone.
3. Automobiles e»349(8)
While police officer had discretion to
stop defendant for traffic violation, arrest

for burglary was not based on
articulated suspicion where, at time <
only fact that tied defendant to
was presence of vehicle he was
area near where crime occurred;,
of vehicle, without more, did not j
to reasonable suspicion.
4. Automobiles «=>349(15)
Police officer did not have disc
remove defendant from his vehicle/!
cuff him, and place him under arrestl
witnessing defendant exceed speedy
while entering driveway absent any i
able articulable suspicion that defend
was involved in earlier burglaries. ^
Joan C. Watt and James C. Bradsh
Salt Lake City, for defendant and
lant
R. Paul Van Dam and Kris C. Leon
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and app
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON andRUSSON, JJ.
-s
OPINION
RUSSON, Judge:
Todd Allen Parker appeals his conv
tions of three counts of burglary ofjl.
dwelling, a second degree felony, in vioW
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990U
We reverse and remand.
,^g»|
FACTS
- a|
On the night of September 5 and the,,
early morning hours of September 6, 1990^
three garages in and around a West Jordan ;
subdivision in Salt Lake County were bur- ^
glarized. In response to a dispatch caH,
Deputy Wayne Dial drove to the home of
one of the victims, Sharon Gamboa. Mrs.
Gamboa informed him that she had heard
someone in the garage and, upon investigation, discovered that some items had been
removed from the vehicles therein. The
outside door to the garage was ajar, a
screen had been cut from one of the garage
windows, and the window had been opened.
Mrs. Gamboa then described two men
whom she had seen immediately thereafter
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in the vicinity of her garage, walk
19*"
-Boss her lawn, and proceed on a sidewalk
gi front of her house.
During a subsequent search of a ballpark
gits located near Mrs. Gamboa's house,
Deputy Dial found an unoccupied, parked
T€hicle. He ran a license plate check, discovered that the owner was Elna LaFreniere, and requested that dispatch contact
her. Deputy Dial then left the car and,
with the assistance of four other officers,
established a perimeter watch around the
vehicle, covering the five exits from the
ballpark area. Approximately ten minutes
after establishing the perimeter, another
officer, Deputy Robert Bobrowski, saw the
taillights of the vehicle light up and move
northbound across the lawn of the ballpark
area. After further investigation, he discovered tire tracks across the lawn from
the spot where the vehicle had been
parked.
Dispatch contacted Mrs. LaFreniere and
learned that she thought that the vehicle
was in her garage but, upon looking, she
discovered that both the vehicle and her
grandson, Parker, were gone. Dispatch
asked Mrs. LaFreniere if she wanted the
vehicle reported as stolen, and she responded that she did not Dispatch relayed this
information to Deputy Dial. Nevertheless,
Corporal Troy Naylor was sent to Mrs.
LaFreniere's home and spoke briefly with
her concerning the absence of both her
vehicle and her grandson. He then positioned his patrol car approximately two
houses away from her house to await the
vehicle's return.
Ten to fifteen minutes later, Parker arrived, driving his grandmothers vehicle.
According to Corporal Naylor's estimate,
Parker was driving at a speed of at least
forty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five
mile per hour zone. The vehicle skidded
into the driveway, at which time Corporal
Naylor radioed for a back-up and pulled his
vehicle in behind Parker's vehicle to prevent it from leaving. He unhoistered his
gun and ordered Parker to exit his vehicle
and stand up against it. After determining
that Parker did not have any weapons on
mm, Corporal Naylor handcuffed him and

placed him under arrest Parker was put
in the back seat of Deputy Troester's police
vehicle, which had just arrived. Corporal
Naylor requested and received permission
from Parker's grandmother to search her
vehicle. He found four flashlights in the
vehicle, two of which Mrs. LaFreniere
could not identify.
Deputy Troester read Parker his rights,
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S.Ct 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966),
and Parker indicated that he was unsure
whether he wanted to talk to the officers.
The deputy asked no further questions concerning possible criminal activity, but did
ask for basic information necessary to book
Parker. Subsequently, from either the police radio or from the officers' conversations outside the police vehicle, Parker
learned that his grandmother had told the
officers about a friend of his, David Green.
Parker then told Deputy Troester that he
had been with Green and that they had
committed the burglaries, and offered to
take him to Green's apartment. Green was
picked up, and the officers proceeded to
Mrs. Gamboa's subdivision with Parker and
Green. En route, Parker told Deputy
Troester that he had two dollars in his
pocket and that it was half of the money
that he and Green had gotten that evening.
Additionally, he pointed out the three garages that they had burglarized that night,
explaining in two instances how they had
entered and what they had taken.
Upon their arrival at the Gamboa residence, Mrs. Gamboa positively identified
Parker and Green as the individuals she
had seen immediately following the burglary of her garage. Parker was taken to the
Salt Lake County Jail and charged with
three counts of burglary. Parker subsequently pleaded not guilty to the charges
and moved to suppress all evidence seized
following his arrest The matter was tried
to the court, and Parker was found guilty
as charged.
The sole issue presented on appeal is
whether the trial court erred in denying
Parker's motion to suppress evidence of
the three burglaries obtained subsequent
to his arrest. Specifically, Parker argues
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that the police did not have the requisite
probable cause to arrest him, and that his
subsequent statements were elicited in violation of his rights under Miranda and the
Fifth Amendment The State responds
that the police had probable cause to arrest
him on the traffic violation, and that the
conversation overheard by Parker did not
amount to interrogation, and thus, Parker's
statements were not obtained in violation
of his right to remain silent.
ANALYSIS
"A trial court's findings of fact underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress must be upheld unless they are
clearly erroneous. However, we review
the trial court's legal conclusions in regards thereto under a correction of error
standard." State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d
1033, 1035 (Utah App.1992) (citing State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.
1991)).
[1] We first address Parker's argument
that the police lacked probable cause to
arrest him after stopping him for the
speeding violation. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated^]" U.S.
Const amend. IV. It is well settled that a
police officer's stop of a vehicle is a "seizure" and therefore subject to fourth
amendment protections. See Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct 1391,
1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Sandy City v.
Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App.
1989). However, the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit all seizures, but only unreasonable ones. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968). Since a traffic stop is a limited
seizure and is more like an investigative
detention than a custodial arrest, United
States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th
Cir.1991) (citing Berkemer v. McCarthy,
468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct 3138, 3149, 82
1. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) provides:
The commission, and such officers and inspectors of the department as it shall desig-

L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)), we assess the ^ B
ableness of such a stop under prmetfgfl
governing investigative detentions^EB
forth in Terry. Id. at 815 (titing-rjMjJ
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512&33
(10th Cir.1988)). Under Terry, the d e t m S
nation of whether a seizure is reasobaiiP
involves a two-pronged test (1) Wa^fJUi
officer's action justified at its inceptkm!
and (2) Was his action reasonably relatetfw
scope to the circumstances which jnatHCJj
the interference in the first place? ftmPjj
392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct at 1879; aceartx
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Uffi
App.1990).
• «yj|j
[2] As to whether Corporal Naylor's i £
tion was justified at its inception, we ha?v
previously stated that a stop "can be justfe*!
fied only upon a showing of reasonably
suspicion that defendant had committed «£
was committing a crime or that he war"
stopped incident to a traffic offense1^
Thorsness, 778 P.2d at 1012 (citation omit*
ted); accord State v. Dorsey, 731 PJ2d[;
1085, 1087 (Utah 1986); State v. Holme^
774 P.2d 506, 507-08 (Utah App.l989k
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (UtaT
App.1988). "Whether there are objective:
facts to justify such a stop depends on the.
'totality of the circumstances.' " Holmes^
71A P.2d at 508 (quoting State v. Mendoza^
748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987)). Corporal
Naylor's undisputed testimony was that
Parker was driving at a speed of at least
forty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five
mile per hour zone. It is readily apparent
from these facts that it was proper for
Corporal Naylor to stop Parker. Thus, the
initial stop was clearly justified in this case/
However, we cannot say that Corporal
Naylor's actions following the stop of Parker's vehicle were reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place. Although Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988)
grants police officers discretion to arrest
individuals who violate any provision of the
Motor Vehicle Act,1 we hold that, under the
nate. peace officers, state patrolmen, and others duly authorized by the department or by
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circumstances of this case, the decision to
Parker was an abuse of that discre-

i r W st

in regard to the length and scope of
traffic stops, the Supreme Court has held
that the detention "must be temporary and
bst no longer than is necessary to effectuiie the purpose of the stop." Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct 1319,
1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Similarly, the
Utah Supreme Court has stated that the
length and scope of a detention for a traffic violation "must be 'strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible/' State v.
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct.
at 1879); accord State v. Lovegren, 829
P2d 155, 158 (Utah App.1992). Additionally, this court, as well as other courts, has
consistently held that "once the reasons for
the initial stop of the vehicle have been
completed, the occupants must be allowed
to proceed on their way." Lovegren, 829
P.2d at 158. "Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after
the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial
traffic stop is justified under the fourth
amendment only if the detaining officer
has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity." Id. (quoting State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.1990));
accord Walker, 933 F.2d at 816; Guzman,
864 F.2d at 1519. "Whether reasonable
suspicion exists depends upon the 'totality
of the circumstances.'" Lovegren, 829
P.2d at 158 (citations omitted).
[3] Our analysis therefore centers on
whether Corporal Naylor had a reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity beiaw shall have power and it shall be their
dutv

yond the traffic offense justifying further
detention of Parker and his ultimate arrest
Such is clearly lacking here. At the time
that Corporal Naylor stopped Parker, the
only fact known to the officer that even
remotely tied Parker to the burglaries was
the presence of the vehicle he was driving
in a ball field near where one of the crimes
occurred. It is axiomatic that presence at
or near the scene of a crime, without more,
does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. See Brovrn v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); State v. Carpena, 714
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam);
Steward, 806 P.2d at 216.
[4] In fact, it is difficult to imagine any
circumstances surrounding a routine traffic
stop m which the actions taken by Corporal
Naylor in this case would be justified.2
After witnessing Parker speed into his
grandmother's driveway, Corporal Naylor
pulled his vehicle behind Parker's, unholstered his gun, removed Parker from his
vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed him
under arrest. There is no evidence that
Parker was making any attempt at escape;
to the contrary, the vehicle was in neutral
and pointed toward the garage. At this
point, Corporal Naylor had no reasonable
articulable suspicion that Parker had committed or was about to commit a crime.
Under the circumstances present here, it is
patently offensive to suggest that a police
officer acting as Corporal Naylor did here
was within the realm of discretion granted
to police officers under the law. Accordingly, we hold that Corporal Naylor's acrequire the driver thereof to stop, exhibit his
drivers license and the registration card issued
for the vehicles and submit to an inspection of
such vehicle, the registration plates and registration card thereon.
Id. (emphasis added).

(b) To make arrests upon view and without
warrant for any violation committed in their
presence of any of the provisions of this act or
other law regulating the operation of vehicles
or the use of the highways.
2. We do not, however, express any opinion as to
Id. (emphasis added). However, section 41-1the appropnateness of arrest in those situations
17 also provides that an officer may alternativein which extenuating circumstances remove a
lv inmate the more usual traffic stop:
traffic stop from the realm of a "routine" traffic
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief
stop, such as leading the police on a high speed
that any vehicle is being operated in violation
chase or driving under the influence of alcohol
of any provision of this act or of any other
or drugs.
law regulating the operation of vehicles to
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tdons were not reasonable in light of the
facts in this case.3
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying Parker's
motion to suppress evidence of the three
burglaries obtained subsequent to the stop
for the speeding violation. Accordingly,
the denial of that motion and Parker's conviction are reversed, and this matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
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Joanne HOLLAND, Petitioner,
v.

STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION,
DIVISION OF REHABILITATION
SERVICES, Respondent
No. 910409-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 12, 1992.

1. United States e=»82(2)
-«4i
State agency providing vocational
habitation services for handicapped n^
sons has discretion to determine whetfca
comparable benefits must be utffizefct
whole or in part to meet cost of sudtTgi
vices; so long as agency reasonably exm
cises such discretion, its decision win k
affirmed. Higher Education Act of ]££{
§ 401(b), as amended, 20 UJS.QJ
§ 1070(b).
/. 4g,|
2. United States <s=»82(2)
'
^
Federal education assistance, includinj
Pell Grant, which handicapped person qua]
ified for after state agency had develop*
plan under which person would receive bea
efits for educational rehabilitation service
in order to attend university, constitute
"comparable benefits" requiring agency U
deny person reimbursement for transporta
tion costs; Pell Grant, in amount of $28
per month during academic year, could IN
spent on education costs, including tram
portation costs, and person's transportatioi
expenses amounted to approximately $2K
per month. Higher Education Act of 196SJ
§§ 401(b), 411F(5)(A, B), as amended,. 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 1070(b), 1070a-6(5KAt B). "~j
See publication Words and Phrases j j
for other judicial constructions and_.
definitions.
"*

^M
Handicapped person challenged state
agency's denial of reimbursement for
transportation costs associated with vocational rehabilitation. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that federal education
assistance, including Pell Grant, which
handicapped person qualified for after
state agency had developed plan under
which person would receive benefits for
educational rehabilitation services in order
to attend university, constituted "comparable benefits" requiring agency to deny person reimbursement for transportation
costs.
Affirmed.
3. Since Parker's sutements must be suppressed
because they were made during the course of
what we have already concluded to be an improper arrest, we do not address Parkers sec-

Robert B. Denton (argued) Legal CentH
for People With Disabilities, Salt Lake CStf*
for petitioner.
'" ^
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen. «d
John S. McAllister, Asst Atty. Gen. (tr;
gued), Salt Lake City, for respondent "!
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and *
RUSSON, JJ.
^
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:

*

Joanne Holland petitions this court &
review a determination by a fair hearfflf
ond claim that his subsequent statements **J
elicited in violation of his rights under Aft—*•
and the Fifth Amendment.
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite, 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE S^TATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR RETURN OF FINE,
COSTS AND FEES AND NOTICE
OF HEARING

Plaintiff,

£-*%.
Case No. 901901633FS
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON

TODD PARKER,
Defendant.

MOTION
COMES NOW the defendant above named by and through his
attorney of record LISA J. REMAL, and hereby moves this court to
order the return of any fines, costs and fees he paid as part of his
sentence in the above-entitled case.

Grounds for this motion are

that the defendant's conviction was overturned by the Utah Court of
Appeals and his case was thereafter dismissed.

It is, therefore, in

the interest of justice that all fines, costs and fees paid by the
defendant be returned to him.
uK
day of August, 1992.
DATED this
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

TlfX V V & M /

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney foir Defendant
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OCT t 9 1992

LISA J. REMAL, (#2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

Ge^-iy Cieflc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR RETURN OF FINE, COSTS AND
FEES

V.

TODD ALLEN PARKER,

Case No. 901901633FS
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendant.

Based upon the defendant's motion for return of fines,
costs and fees which was heard on the dates of September 4, 1992 and
September 15, 1992, and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that fines shall be returned to the
defendant but any money paid for rehabilitation will not be returned
to the defendant.
DATED this / y day of October, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
Third District Court
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the
South Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Suite S-3700,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, this }lj ' day of October, 1992.
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Accounting — — — —
-265-5933
Records
—
—
-265-5913
-265-5935
Collection Department
-265-5901
Truancy Court
Juvemw Probation O f f i c e s East Office 525 E 4500 Soutn Murray — 262-6053
Surte F-100
Serf Lake Office
533-5657
205 W 700 South Suite 304
West office
969-6282
2964 W 4700 South Surte 111
West Valley Gty
Continued On Next Column

Small Claims •
SaaaM Claims Filing
Instructions-—Traffic
*ryAsstOerk of The Court
Court Executive and Clerk of
Court
Fechs Dennis M <
ClerkiWIUWKJS micnaei u •
ClerkMcOeveSheHaKClerkPMIipKOerkWClerkSandy Oepertmerrr-440 East 8680

AsstOerk of Court Court Executive and Clerk of
Court
Livingston Roger A •
OerfcWaet Valley 0*oertment-3636S

-533-3911
-533-3921
-533-3914
-533-3910
-533-3901
-533-3939
-533-3980
-533-3980
-533-3900
-533-3980
-533-3900
-533-3980
-533-3900
-533-3980
-533-3900
-533-3980
-533-3900
-533-3980

-533-7884
-533-7885
-533-7887
-533-7883
-533*7888
-533-7884
-533-3980
-S33-733S
-533-7335

Oerks Office—

Traffic •
Juryt Oerfc of CourtCourt Executive and Oerk of
Court

Medley Tyrone E *
OerfcThorne William A«lrdark

Oerfc-

-533-7889
-533-7889
-533-7889
-533-7889
-533-5939
-533-7889
-533-3980
-533-7889
-533-7889
-533-7889
-S33-7889
-533-7889
-533-7889

Second Orcurt CourtsBountiful Department- 745 South
Traffic OerfcOvdOerk
CreajnaiADUiOerfc

-298-6150
-298-6151
-296-6152
-298-6153
-298-6154
-298-6153
-298-6160

Chief Oerfc •
Jury Duty AdBMnstralion 745 5 Man 8ndl—
ex unent" 425 N
HOrl
-546-2484
Traffic CriniHiei-544-2201
SmoMOaimsAGvil
Junes-544-3403
Sunset Department
825-3303
S5W1B00Norm Sunset
CRIME VICTIM REPARATIONS OFFICE

-533-4000
350E50OSQ**
-800621-7444
ToJIFree-OieJlATfcenCRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
-538-1031
iQl Sta»C*g*o) •
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU -263-1363
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